
Osama Abboud, Andre König, Christian Gottron: Quality Adaptation and Security in Peer-to-Peer Systems. 9th Würzburg Workshop on IP: Joint ITG and Euro-NF Workshop "Visions of Future Generation Networks" (EuroView2009), EuroView Poster, July 2009.



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# Quality Adaptation and Security in Peer-to-Peer Systems



# Multi-level Analysis of Attacks in Peer-to-Peer Systems

#### Attacks in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Peer-to-Peer evolved from filesharing to commercial applications

. E.g. video streaming, telephony and messaging

Distributed hash tables are basis for future evolution

- Enable service lookup without central instances
  Fully decentralized, self-organizing, highly scalable


But: Various new possibilities for misbehavio

- Attacks target at the lookup process
- . E.g. refusal attack, incorrect lookup routing
- Low effort but high impact
- Contemporary peer-to-peer systems lack self-protection

Goal: Systematic classification and analysis of attack vectors

- As foundation for developing appropriate security measures · With G-Lab and PlanetLab as real-world environments

• To improve mathematical models and simulation tools



## G-Lab Work: Analyzing Effects of Attacks on System Performance


- Cover large range from few to millions of peers
- E.g. possibility for successful lookup (σ) depending on
- Number of peers (N), fraction of malicious peers (f), bit size of one ID digit (b)

- Cover 10<sup>4</sup> to 10<sup>6</sup> nodes
- · Depending on hardware and abstraction
- E.g. simulated overlay, modeled network

- · German national testbed
- Currently about 175 homogeneous nodes

PlanetLab testbed

- Worldwide testhed
- · Currently about 1000 inhomogeneous nodes



# **Decentralized Preventive Security Measures for Peer-to-Peer Systems**

## Attack Prevention

Attack prevention is based on means such as authentication and admission control

- Restricts access to sensitive resources and closed user groups
- Usually requires central trusted instance and predefined security policies

But: Trusted instance and security policies not available in peer-to-peer environme

- · Compensation possible by user-based cooperative decisions
- Mathematical fundament: Threshold cryptography

Goal: Develop and validate models describing user-based cooperative decisions

- As tools for governing the decision process
- E.g. optimize number of users involved to avoid unnecessary decision requests



## **G-Lab Work: Model Validation**

g. interaction between a peer requesting authentication and group of authenticating peers


- Considered here: Random requests
- No knowledge on distribution of keyshares at requesting peer
- Requests are sent to randomly selected peers
- · Authentication successful if at least a certain number (threshold) of peers approved identity

First results show differences between individual testbeds

- Match of model predictions and results from PlanetLab No exact match of model predictions and G-Lab
- · Why?

Next steps: Identify reasons for divergence of results

- Adapt/generalize models appropriately
  Fundamental comparison of PlanetLab and G-Lab





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